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Simple	re-framing	unlikely	to	boost	public	support	for	
climate	policy		
Ambitious	policies	for	limiting	climate	change	require	strong	public	
support1,3,12,15,16,19,20,29.	But	the	public’s	appetite	for	such	policies,	as	
currently	observed	in	most	countries,	is	rather	limited3,27.	One	possibility	
for	enhancing	public	support	could	be	to	shift	the	main	justification	in	the	
public	policy	discourse	on	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	mitigation	from	benefits	
of	reducing	climate	change	risks	(the	conventional	justification)	to	other	
types	of	benefits.	Technological	innovation	and	green	jobs,	community	
building,	and	health	benefits	are	widely	discussed	
candidates2,5,9,10,11,14,17,21,26.	The	intuition	is	that	re-framing	GHG	mitigation	
efforts	and	their	benefits	in	such	terms	could	make	them	more	personally	
relevant	and	more	emotionally	engaging	and	appealing	to	citizens28,25.	
However,	based	on	results	from	two	survey	embedded	experiments	
(combined	N=1664),	and	in	contrast	to	some	earlier	studies,	we	conclude	
that	simple	re-framing	of	climate	policy	is	unlikely	to	increase	public	
support,	and	outline	reasons	for	this	finding.	As	the	added	value	of	other	
justifications	remains	unclear	at	best	and	potentially	nil,	sticking	to	climate	
risk	reduction	as	the	dominant	justification	seems	worthwhile.			In	many	if	not	most	countries,	rapid	progress	towards	a	low	carbon	economy	appears	technically	feasible,	but	politically	impossible.	Strong	worries	among	elites	and	citizens	about	negative	effects	on	economic	growth	and	lifestyles,	discounting	of	future	benefits	of	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	mitigation,	and	concerns	about	freeriding	by	other	countries	spoil	the	public’s	appetite	for	ambitious	mitigation	measures3.	For	instance,	as	observed	in	a	recent	survey,	concern	in	the	United	States	(the	largest	per	capita	GHG	emitter	globally)	regarding	climate	change	and	its	impact	is	the	lowest	among	40	countries	in	the	study27.	However,	without	strong	public	support,	ambitious	climate	policy	is	infeasible	since	mitigation	measures	are	bound	to	have	important	and	manifest	implications	for	nearly	every	citizen.	Therefore,	democratic	policy-makers	face	strong	incentives	to	adopt	policies	preferred	by	the	majority	of	voters3,29.		Current	efforts	to	conceptualize	climate	policy	in	terms	of	preventing	a	tragedy	of	the	commons	(dangerous	global	warming)	and	focusing	on	fair	burden	sharing	among	nations	to	produce	a	global	public	good	does	not	seem	to	win	people’s	hearts	and	minds.	The	implications	of	modest	to	low	domestic	public	support	are	obvious	at	the	international	level	too:	governments	are	locked	into	cumbersome	distributional	bargaining	over	lowest	common	denominator	mitigation	targets,	and	the	enthusiasm	in	frontrunner	countries	(above	all	in	Western	Europe)	also	appears	to	wane.	How	could	public	support	and	thus	political	feasibility	at	domestic	and	international	levels	be	increased?	Various	scientists	and	commentators	have	suggested	re-framing	climate	policy	from	an	effort	to	reduce	or	avoid	climate	change	risks	to	either	an	effort	to	accelerate	a	major	technological	transition	that	will	foster	innovation	and	create	green	jobs,	or	to	an	effort	to	protect	the	public	
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from	climate	change-induced	health	hazards.	Could	such	re-framing	increase	the	public’s	appetite	for	ambitious	climate	policy?		Existing	research	has	produced	some	evidence	for	such	“emphasis	framing	effects”6,	that	is,	effects	on	public	opinion	of	highlighting	particular	purposes	and	benefits	of	reducing	GHG	emissions5,14.	Building	on	this	research	(most	notably2,9,10,11,17,21,26)	we	carried	out	two	experiments	(combined	N=1664)	with	participants	from	the	United	States	(Figure	1).		
Figure	1:	Emphasis-Framing	Experiments	
	As	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	texts	that	justified	(framed)	climate	policy	in	terms	of	having	different	types	of	benefits:	climate	risk	reduction,	economic	co-benefits,	community	building,	and	health	benefits	respectively.	Support	(or	opposition)	to	climate	policy	was	measured	based	on	three	composite	variables,	each	of	which	was	constructed	based	on	a	set	of	survey	items	(see	section	1	in	the	SI	for	full	details).	The	data	shown	in	Figure	2	suggests	interesting	variation	when	the	three	measures	are	compared.	Top-down	efforts	to	mitigate	climate	change,	as	captured	by	the	policy	support	measure,	receive	stronger	support	than	requirements	for	citizens	to	become	more	actively	engaged	in	mitigating	GHG	emissions,	as	captured	by	the	behavioral	intentions	and	environmental	citizenship	measures.	Also,	we	find	that	those	who	do	not	believe	climate	change	is	a	serious	problem	are	overwhelmingly	against	active	personal	engagement.	Nevertheless,	a	considerable	share	of	these	respondents	support	active	climate	policy	by	the	government,	suggesting	some	maneuvering	room	even	amongst	
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those	who	do	not	consider	climate	change	to	be	a	serious	problem.	Similarly,	although	respondents	who	believe	climate	change	is	a	serious	problem	are	strongly	in	favor	of	emissions	mitigation	policy,	the	responses	for	environmental	citizenship	are	much	more	dispersed.	This	suggests	that	many	respondents	aware	of	the	climate	change	problem	would	nevertheless	prefer	to	be	passive	actors	in	climate	policy.	These	trends	are	similar	for	other	measures	of	climate	skepticism	and	awareness	(see	section	6	of	the	SI).		
Figure	2:	Climate	Policy	Support:	Distribution	of	three	climate	policy	support	
measures	in	both	experiments,	conditional	upon	whether	respondents	believe	
climate	change	is	a	serious	problem	or	not.	The	overall	distribution	is	also	shown	
for	comparison.	
		Could	emphasizing	economic,	community,	and	public	health	benefits	engender	more	policy	support	for	and	active	personal	engagement	in	GHG	mitigation,	as	measured	by	our	three	composite	variables?	Can	such	(re-)framing	generate	more	support	amongst	those	who	are	skeptical	about	whether	climate	change	is	a	serious	problem?		Previous	research	suggests	that	the	effect	of	emphasis	frames,	as	conceptualized	in	our	study,	could	be	stronger	in	the	case	of	climate	change	skeptics2.	Hence	we	use	a	range	of	survey	items	to	identify	individuals	in	terms	of	climate	skepticism,	climate	awareness,	and	political	ideology	and	examine	conditional	treatment	effects	(for	details	of	the	statistical	analysis	see	section	5	of	the	SI).	As	Figure	3	illustrates,	there	is	very	little	difference	across	the	treatment	conditions	in	climate	policy	preferences	overall.	For	each	of	the	three	experimental	conditions,	and	each	of	the	three	outcome	measures,	there	are	no	consistent	patterns	in	treatment	effects.	The	average	treatment	(framing)	effects	
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are	very	weak,	and	not	statistically	significant	at	conventional	levels.	Even	when	exploring	potential	subgroup	effects,	such	as	the	differences	between	climate	skeptics	and	non-skeptics,	the	treatment	effects	do	not	change	significantly.	Although	there	are	some	potentially	large	treatment	effects	in	the	case	of	policy	support	–	for	example	amongst	people	who	do	not	believe	climate	change	is	serious	in	the	first	experiment	–	these	effects	are	negative.	This	result	runs	counter	to	the	idea	that	these	changes	in	framing	can	stimulate	support	for	climate	change	mitigation	amongst	those	predisposed	against	it.	Even	so,	these	effects	are	not	statistically	significant	at	conventional	levels.		
Figure	3:	Framing	Effects:	Estimated	average	treatment	effects	and	sub-group	
treatment	effects	based	upon	respondents’	level	of	climate	change	skepticism,	
climate	awareness,	and	party	affiliation.	Points	indicate	the	estimated	effect,	lines	
indicate	95%	confidence	intervals	with	the	90%	confidence	interval	in	bold.	
		In	summary,	we	do	not	find	any	robust	empirical	evidence	for	alternative	framing	(justification)	of	climate	policy	being	able	to	increase	public	support	for	GHG	mitigation	–	whether	in	the	sample	as	a	whole	or	amongst	particular	groups	of	participants	(such	as	climate	skeptics).	This	means	that	our	findings	do	not	support	earlier	results	from	what	in	our	view	is	the	most	relevant	prior	study	of	a	similar	nature2. Framing	effects	are	largely	insignificant	in	those	parts	of	our	experiments	that	were	deliberately	designed	to	be	very	similar	to	the	Bain	et	al.	study	(frame	wording	for	climate	risk,	community	building,	economic	co-benefits;	environmental	citizenship	intentions,	see	Figure	1).	The	same	result	obtains	when	using	different	response	measures	that	capture	climate	policy	
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attitudes	and	preferences	more	directly,	and	adding	an	additional	frame	(health	benefits).			Where	does	this	leave	us?	Critics	might	argue	that	we	simply	failed	to	detect	a	treatment	effect	that	does	exist	(often	called	“type	II	error”).	One	could	of	course	modify	the	frame	wordings	(treatments)	we	used	–	we	chose	them	because	we	found	them	quite	compelling	and	they	were	partly	used	in	a	previously	published	article	in	this	journal.	And	one	could	add	visually	more	powerful	graphical	treatment	conditions.	Also,	using	a	different	sample	from	the	United	States	or	another	country	could	potentially	change	the	results.	Although	we	cannot	exclude	this	possibility,	we	think	that	our	results	reflect	conditions	that	render	it	difficult,	generally,	to	effectively	shift	public	opinion	on	climate	policy	(and	probably	any	environmental	policy)	through	simple	re-framing	of	policy	justifications	or	benefits.		In	reality,	citizens	are	exposed	to	many	competing	claims	(frames	and	counter-frames)	about	costs	and	benefits	of	different	climate	policy	measures	and	the	need	to	act	against	climate	change4,8,18,23,24.	Depending	on	prior	attitudes,	knowledge	and	interest	in	climate	issues	(among	other	factors)	individuals	tend	to	select	particular	types	of	information	on	climate	policy	issues,	as	provided	by	the	media,	friends,	and	other	sources.	This	information	abundance	means	that,	to	varying	degrees,	survey	participants	are	already	“pre-treated”	once	they	enter	into	a	framing	experiment.	This	makes	identification	of	significant	framing	effects	less	likely,	perhaps	with	the	exception	of	people	who	know	little	about	climate	change	and/or	hold	weak	or	ambivalent	attitudes	on	the	issue7.	Hence	it	is	not	surprising	that	framing	effects	observed	in	other	studies	tend	to	be	rather	weak	and	inconsistent,	probably	with	a	tendency	of	many	“non-findings”	not	getting	published,	and	that	in	our	own	research	such	effects	are	largely	absent.		Moreover,	a	large	amount	of	research	shows	that	climate	policy	preferences	are	strongly	shaped	by	factors	that	cannot	be	affected	or	offset	through	climate	change	communication	per	se	(e.g.	political	ideology,	income,	gender,	general	social	norms,	weather	or	climatic	conditions,	economic	conditions	of	the	respective	country1,12,15,16,19,20.	And	it	is	precisely	those	factors	that	are	likely	to	also	influence	(self-selected	or	involuntary)	exposure	to	particular	types	of	climate	change	information.	Existing	research	shows	that	people	usually	select	information	lining	up	with	prior	beliefs	and	attitudes	to	preserve	their	existing	worldviews,	self-concept,	and	self-worth22,	or	to	sustain	beliefs	that	are	in	line	with	prevailing	values,	ideologies,	and	beliefs	in	their	social	network13.		In	brief,	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	presume	that	individuals’	climate	policy	attitudes	are	strongly	shaped	by	the	pre-treatment	environment	and	various	personal	predispositions,	and	that	this	tends	to	“immunize”	experimental	participants	against	simple	information	treatments.	So,	what	are	the	odds	that	shifting	the	main	justification	for	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	mitigation	from	benefits	of	reducing	climate	change	risks	to	other	types	of	benefits	would	increase	political	support	for	and	thus	the	political	feasibility	of	ambitious	GHG	mitigation	measures?	Our	findings	point	to	major	uncertainty	in	this	regard,	and	to	a	need	for	more	research	based	on	more	elaborate	experimental	designs.	Such	experiments	would	have	to	pitch	particular	frames	and	counter-frames	against	each	other.	They	would	have	to	focus	on	how	
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different	combinations	of	frames	(rather	than	receiving	a	single	frame	as	a	treatment)	affect	public	support.	They	would	have	to	control	for	individuals’	self-selection	of	information.	Such	experiments	could	also	include	visual	frames,	which	might	have	a	stronger	effect	than	text	messages.		Pending	that,	and	based	on	what	we	know	to	date,	policy-makers	should	keep	a	strong	focus	on	climate	risk	reduction	as	the	dominant	justification.	The	reason	is	that	time,	money,	political	capital,	and	public	attention,	all	of	which	are	needed	for	re-framing	the	justification	for	climate	policy	in	effective	ways,	are	very	much	limited.	This	implies	a	considerable	risk	that	much	increased	emphasis	of	other	benefits,	the	public	support	increasing	effect	of	which	remains	unclear,	could	come	at	the	expense	of	the	climate	risk-based	justification,	into	which	the	IPCC,	the	scientific	community	as	a	whole,	and	most	governments	and	civil	society	have	invested	very	heavily	over	the	past	decades.			
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